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Abstract
This article proposes a Bayesian estimation of demand functions under block-rate
pricing by focusing on increasing block-rate pricing. This is the ﬁrst study that explicitly
considers the separability condition which has been ignored in previous literature. Under
this pricing structure, the price changes when consumption exceeds a certain threshold
and the consumer faces a utility maximization problem subject to a piecewise-linear bud-
get constraint. Solving this maximization problem leads to a statistical model in which
model parameters are strongly restricted by the separability condition. In this article, by
taking a hierarchical Bayesian approach, we implement a Markov chain Monte Carlo sim-
ulation to properly estimate the demand function. We ﬁnd, however, that the convergence
of the distribution of simulated samples to the posterior distribution is slow, requiring an
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1additional scale transformation step for parameters to the Gibbs sampler. These proposed
methods are then applied to estimate the Japanese residential water demand function.
Key words: Discrete/continuous choice approach, Markov chain Monte Carlo method,
Piecewise-linear budget constraint, Residential water demand, Separability condition.
JEL classiﬁcation: C11, C24, Q25.
1 Introduction
Block-rate pricing is a nonlinear pricing system often applied to public utilities, such as water.
In contrast to other goods and services oﬀered at a single price, consumers under block-rate
pricing face several prices corresponding to the level of consumption. Income tax also has
this pricing structure because the marginal tax rate changes according to total income. Gen-
eral microeconomic theory suggests that the most eﬃcient allocation is achieved by setting a
good’s unit price equal to its production cost per unit, which is called marginal cost pricing.
However, in practice, several market issues exist that make marginal cost pricing inapplicable.
In such cases, block-rate pricing is often employed by regulators.
To derive the demand function under block-rate pricing, we adopt a discrete/continuous
choice approach, which Burtless and Hausman (1978) ﬁrst used to analyze taxation’s eﬀect on
the labor supply (see also Hanemann (1984); Hausman (1985); Moﬃtt (1986)). Model speci-
ﬁcations of this kind are commonly used to evaluate tax policy or examine consumer behavior
under block-rate pricing structures, such as labor supply (Burtless and Hausman, 1978), food
stamp expenditure (Moﬃtt, 1989), car ownership and use (de Jong, 1990), electricity demand
(Herriges and King, 1994; Reiss and White, 2005), and water demand (Hewitt and Hanemann,
1995; Olmstead, Hanemann, and Stavins, 2007).
While this approach is based on the consumer’s maximization problem, a correspond-
ing statistical model strongly restricts the model parameters. Furthermore, as Moﬃtt (1986)
2pointed out, there is not only a computational burden but also the non-diﬀerentiability of the
likelihood function. Thus, previous studies have exclusively estimated the demand function
under two-block-rate pricing. The only exception seems to be Olmstead et al. (2007), who
considered the multiple-block-rate pricing, where the number of blocks varies from two to
four, using the maximum likelihood method. This method, however, ignored the so-called
separability condition, which becomes important as the number of blocks increases. In Japan,
consumers usually face more than two blocks (speciﬁcally, between ﬁve and eleven for water
andbetweenthreeandfourforelectricity), whichrequirestheconsiderationofmultiple-block-
rate pricing.
Therefore, this article takes a hierarchical Bayesian approach and implements a Markov
chain Monte Carlo (MCMC) simulation to properly estimate the demand function; see Chib
(2001) and Chib and Greenberg (1996) for the MCMC methodology and its use in econo-
metrics, respectively. The present paper allows two practical attributes that previous studies
excluded. First, we allow the number of blocks to be greater than two. Then, we use the
discrete/continuous approach to derive the demand function as a multinomial generalization
of the Type V Tobit model; see Chapter 10 of Amemiya (1985) for Tobit classiﬁcations and
Chib (1992) for a pioneering study of the Bayesian approach in Tobit modeling. Second, we
explicitly consider the separability condition, which guarantees that consumer preferences are
divided into disjoint blocks. This condition has been ignored in previous studies yet plays a
critical role, especially in multiple-block-rate pricing.
We ﬁnd, however, that the distribution of samples obtained from the Gibbs sampler con-
verges very slowly to the posterior distribution. To improve sampling eﬃciency, we introduce
an additional scale transformation step for parameters to the Gibbs sampler based on the gen-
eralized Gibbs step (GGS) developed by Liu and Sabatti (2000).
Therestofthisarticleisorganizedasfollows. InSection2, wedescribethediscrete/continuous
choice approach and the demand function under block-rate pricing. Section 3 explains the sta-
3tistical model, derives its likelihood function and joint posterior density function, and accounts
for the separability condition. With this posterior density function, this section presents the
MCMC algorithm and the corresponding generalized Gibbs step. Section 4 carries out a sim-
ulation study and reveals several properties of our algorithms. After data description, Section
5 applies our proposed method to estimate the residential water demand function in Japan us-
ing microdata, and the price and income elasticities are also estimated to investigate demand
sensitivity in detail. Section 6 provides the conclusion for this article.
2 Demand Function
First, we explain the model settings, following the discussion of Moﬃtt (1986). There are two
types of goods; namely, a good under block-rate pricing and all other goods. Suppose that a
consumer’s demand for a good, Y, is subject to K-block-rate pricing, and that its demand is
strictly positive, Y > 0. Let Ya and I be the expenditure for non-Y goods and total income,
respectively. The price system of Y is as follows. There are K prices, Pk (k = 1,...,K), related
to K blocks. These prices are ﬁxed and considered as given constants throughout this article.
In practice, price often changes monotonically with Pk < Pk+1 or Pk > Pk+1 for k =1,...,K−1.
This article focuses on the price system in which price increases monotonically. That is, Pk <
Pk+1 (k = 1,...,K −1), which is known as increasing block-rate pricing. Japanese residential
water demand data in Section 5 oﬀer an example of increasing block-rate pricing. Let ¯ Yk
denote the upper limit, or threshold, of the k-th block (k = 0,...,K), where ¯ Y0 ≡ 0 and ¯ YK ≡ ∞
for convenience. In addition to marginal prices and thresholds, there is a ﬁxed cost, FC, that
is independent of consumption, Y. At a practical level, this ﬁxed cost represents a minimum
access charge. The threshold values, ¯ Yk, and a ﬁxed cost, FC, are given ﬁxed constants.
Let U(Y,Ya) be the well-deﬁned utility function. Then, the consumer’s utility maximiza-
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Figure 1: Utility maximization problem: three-block case.
tion problem is given by:
V = max
Y,Ya
U(Y,Ya) subject to c(Y)+Ya ≤ I, (1)
where c(Y) = FC+Pk(Y − ¯ Yk−1)+
∑k−1
j=1 Pj(¯ Yj− ¯ Yj−1) if ¯ Yk−1 ≤ Y < ¯ Yk for k = 1,...,K. Figure
1 illustrates a budget constraint and indiﬀerence curve under three-block increasing block-rate
pricing, where the second block is optimal with its optimal demand, Yopt, and level of indirect
utility, V. The budget constraint of this form is a piecewise-linear budget constraint because it
becomes linear given the choice of a block.
Finally, the demand function is derived. Before its derivation, we must deﬁne K condi-








and Qk is an augmented income (also referred to as virtual income). Under Problem (2), the
consumer can maximize utility as if facing a single price, Pk, and virtual income, Qk. Let
5conditional demand Yk be the solution to this conditional utility maximization problem, which
results in the demand function under increasing block-rate pricing:
Y =

      
      
Yk, if ¯ Yk−1 < Yk < ¯ Yk and k = 1,...,K,
¯ Yk, if Yk+1 ≤ ¯ Yk ≤ Yk and k = 1,...,K−1.
(3)
In studying the demand function under block-rate pricing, there are several functional
forms, such as linear, quadratic, and log-linear functions, for the conditional demand, Yk, in
Equation (3); the log-linear conditional demand model is one of the most popular models
used in previous studies (Hewitt and Hanemann, 1995). Thus, this article focuses on the log-
linear model for conditional demand, but our proposed estimation method would apply to
other models in a similar manner. The log-linear model is given by lnYk = β1lnPk+β2lnQk,
where the parameters β1 and β2 represent the price and income elasticities conditional on
block choice, respectively. For simplicity, let y, yk, ¯ yk, pk, and qk denote the logarithm of
demand (Y), k-th conditional demand (Yk), k-th threshold (¯ Yk), k-th marginal price (Pk), and




      
      
yk, if ¯ yk−1 < yk < ¯ yk and k = 1,...,K,
¯ yk, if yk+1 ≤ ¯ yk ≤ yk and k = 1,...,K−1,
(4)
yk = β1pk+β2qk ≡ x x x′
kβ β β, (5)




From this section, we append the subscript i to the i-th consumer’s variables (i = 1,...,n) and
the superscript ∗ to latent variables. For example, yi,¯ yik,pik,qik,Ki are observed variables,
whereas w∗
i,s∗
i are unobserved that will be explained in the following paragraph. We note that
yik, the k-th log conditional demand, is unobserved, as it has no superscript ∗ to avoid tedious
notation. Because we construct a statistical model that assumes diﬀerent block-rate pricing
for diﬀerent observation, variables for block-rate pricing are also marked by the subscript i.
Our statistical model, which is a multinomial extension of Moﬃtt (1986), is described as
follows; see also Hewitt and Hanemann (1995). First, we introduce two unobserved random
variables into the demand function of the i-th consumer, namely, heterogeneity, w∗
i, and state
variable, s∗
i. Heterogeneity is a stochastic term that models consumer characteristics. The w∗
i
is assumed to follow the linear model:
w∗
i = z z z′
iδ δ δ+vi, vi ∼ i.i.d. N(0,σ2
v), (6)
where z z zi and δ δ δ are d×1 vectors of explanatory variables for heterogeneity and corresponding
parameters, respectively, and vi is an independently and identically distributed disturbance
term with a normal distribution of mean 0 and variance σ2
v. We assume that heterogeneity for
the i-th observation, w∗
i, is additive to log conditional demand, yik. Then, the log conditional
7demand with heterogeneity, y∗




      
      
yik+w∗
i, if ¯ yi,k−1 < yik+w∗
i < ¯ yik and k = 1,...,Ki,
¯ yik, if yi,k+1+w∗
i ≤ ¯ yik ≤ yik+w∗
i and k = 1,...,Ki−1,
(7)
where yik = x x x′
ikβ β β and x x xik = (pik,qik)′.
Another latent variable is the state variable, s∗
i. There are 2Ki−1 potential outcomes in the
demand function Equation (7), including Ki conditional demands with heterogeneity (yik+w∗
i)
and Ki−1 threshold demands (¯ yik). The state variable, s∗
i, is an unobserved discrete random
variable taking values from 1 to 2Ki −1 and indicates which outcome the i-th observation
selects; if s∗
i is odd, observation i chooses conditional demand with heterogeneity, and if s∗
i is




      
      
2k−1, if y∗
i = yik+w∗
i and k = 1,...,Ki,
2k, if y∗
i = ¯ yik and k = 1,...,Ki−1.
(8)
It is straightforward from Equation (7) that the condition regarding whether y∗
i equals
yik+w∗
i or ¯ yik is equivalent to the interval condition for heterogeneity.
¯ yi,k−1 < yik+w∗
i < ¯ yik ⇐⇒ w∗





i = 2k−1, (9)
yi,k+1+w∗
i ≤ ¯ yik ≤ yik+w∗
i ⇐⇒ w∗





i = 2k. (10)
Furthermore, we assume that conditional demand yi for the i-th consumer is observed with
a disturbance:
yi = y∗
i +ui, ui ∼ i.i.d. N(0,σ2
u), i = 1,...,n, (11)
where ui may imply optimization, speciﬁcation, and measurement error (Hausman, 1985).
8Finally, the statistical model for the demand function under increasing block-rate pricing
is given by following equations:
yik = x x x′
ikβ β β, x x xik = (pik,qik)′, k = 1,...,Ki, (12)
w∗
i = z z z′





      
      
2k−1, if w∗
i ∈ Ri,2k−1 and k = 1,...,Ki,
2k, if w∗





      
      
yik+w∗
i, if s∗
i = 2k−1 and k = 1,...,Ki,
¯ yik, if s∗
i = 2k and k = 1,...,Ki−1,
(15)
yi = y∗
i +ui, ui ∼ i.i.d. N(0,σ2
u). (16)
Error terms, including measurement error, ui, and the error for heterogeneity, vi, are assumed
to be mutually independent conditional on the block choice s∗
i because they represent diﬀerent
sources of error. This model is a multinomial extension of the Type V Tobit model; see Section
10.10 in Amemiya (1985) for more on the Type V Tobit model.




           
           
1, if w∗
i ∈ Ri1 = (−∞,¯ yi1−yi1),
2, if w∗
i ∈ Ri2 = (¯ yi1−yi1,¯ yi1−yi2),
3, if w∗




           










Remark 2. There may be consumers whose ﬁrst block is a zero marginal price; that is, Pi1 = 0.
They are assumed to consume more than or equal to the ﬁrst threshold, ¯ yi1, as suggested by
economic theory, which implies that s∗
i = 2,...,Ki and Ri2 = (−∞,¯ yi1−yi2).
93.2 Likelihood Function
The augmented likelihood function for observation i is derived by multiplying two probabil-
ity density functions. First, we derive the joint probability density function of unobserved
variables, s∗
i and w∗















































where I(A) is an indicator function taking a value of 1 if A is true and 0 otherwise. The
last truncation term,
∏Ki−1
k=1 I(x x x′
i,k+1β β β ≤ x x x′
ikβ β β), is the separability condition that is ﬁrst explic-
itly considered in this article. The role of the separability condition is explained in the next
subsection.
After the unobserved variables are determined by Equation (18), the conditional probabil-
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Finally, multiplying these two probability density functions (18) and (20), we obtain the aug-



























































3.3 The Separability Condition
We brieﬂy describe the role of the separability condition in our model. The separability condi-
tion is a condition that creates disjointed heterogeneity intervals. It guarantees that the upper
limit is greater than or equal to the lower limit for intervals in Equation (10). Under the
multiple-block-rate pricing, this condition is given by:
yi,k+1 ≤ yik
(
⇐⇒ x x x′
i,k+1β β β ≤ x x x′
ikβ β β
)
for k = 1,...,Ki−1 and i = 1,...,n. (22)
Because β β β is two-dimensional in our case, the separability condition reduces to two condi-
tions. Let r = maxi,k−(pi,k+1− pik)/(qi,k+1−qik), and let r = mini,k−(pi,k+1− pik)/(qi,k+1−qik).
Then, Equation (22) is equivalent to
β2 ≤ rβ1 and β2 ≤ rβ1, (23)
which is the shadowed region found in Figure 2. When the conditional demand includes more
than two variables, the separability condition is given by Equation (22). In this case, we must
addressasmanyinequalityconditionsasthenumberofobservationsandblockstonumerically
maximize the likelihood function.
Let us illustrate the role of the separability condition. Consider the maximization of aug-
mented likelihood under two-block increasing block-rate pricing, assuming that there is only
one observation. Condition (22) then reduces to yi2 ≤ yi1 as the only condition. Without this
condition, the upper and lower limits for kink point demand are allowed to be reversed, and
11β1
β2
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Figure 2: Region suggested by the separability condition.
hence, there could be a case in which ¯ y1−yi2 < w∗
i < ¯ y1−yi1 (see Ri2 of Equatioin (17)). Such
a situation leads to ambiguity in the state variable if s∗
i = 1 or 3. Therefore, any estimation
without the separability condition causes disagreement within the model.
3.4 Posterior Density Function and Gibbs Sampler
First, we assume proper prior distributions for the model parameters (β β β,δ δ δ,σ2
u,σ2
v). For these
parameters, we assume normal distributions for β β β and δ δ δ, conditional on σ2
u and σ2
v, and inverse
gamma distributions for σ2
u and σ2
v.
β β β | σ2
u ∼ N2
(
µ µ µβ β β,0,σ2
uΣ Σ Σβ β β,0
)
, δ δ δ | σ2
v ∼ Nd
(
µ µ µδ δ δ,0,σ2






















where µ µ µβ β β,0, is a 2×1 known vector; Σ Σ Σβ β β,0 = diag(σ2
β1,0,σ2
β2,0) is a 2×2 known diagonal matrix
with diagonal elements (σ2
β1,0,σ2
β2,0); µ µ µδ δ δ,0 is a d ×1 known vector, Σ Σ Σδ δ δ,0 is a known d ×d
covariance matrix; and nu,0 > 0, Su,0 > 0, nv,0 > 0, Sv,0 > 0 are some known constants. In this
article, the subscript on the normal distribution indicates its dimension.
12The posterior density function for the statistical model in Equations (12) through (16) is
obtained by multiplying the augmented likelihood function in Equation (21) over all observa-
tions with the prior density function, π
(







β β β,δ δ δ,σ2
u,σ2
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  , (25)
where y y y = (y1,y2,...,yn)′, y y y∗ = (y∗
1,y∗
2,...,y∗
n)′, s s s∗ = (s∗
1,s∗
2,...s∗




Z Z Z = (z z z1,z z z2,...,z z zn)′.
Under log-linear conditional demand and above priors, the full conditional posterior distri-
butions are all standard distributions, as provided in Appendix A.1. We implement a standard
Gibbs sampler to draw samples from the posterior density function (25), which is summarized
in the following seven steps:
Algorithm 1.1: MCMC algorithm for the model in Equations (12)-(16)
Step 1. Initialize β β β,δ δ δ,s s s∗,w w w∗,σ2
u and σ2
v.
Step 2. Generate β1 given β2,s s s∗,w w w∗,σ2
u.














given β β β,δ δ δ,σ2
u,σ2
v for i = 1,...,n.
Step 6. Generate σ2
u given β β β,s s s∗,w w w∗.
Step 7. Go to Step 2.
A blocking technique is used to sample (s∗
i,w∗
i) in order to isolate the relationship in which
w∗
i determines s∗
i, while blocking in (σ2
v,δ δ δ) is used to accelerate the convergence of MCMC
draws.
133.5 Convergence Acceleration
As we shall see in Sections 4 and 5, the obtained samples of parameters are sometimes highly
autocorrelated so that their convergence to the posterior distribution is slow. This subsection
introduces a generalized Gibbs step proposed by Liu and Sabatti (2000) to improve sampling
eﬃciency. While its implementation is simple, the GGS improves sampling eﬃciency to some
extent in the estimation of the discrete/continuous choice model.
The main idea of the GGS is to add one more sampling step for a transformation group
while keeping the transition kernel of MCMC invariant, so that we can obtain acceleration
eﬀects similar to those of re-parametrization or blocking; see Section 2 of Liu and Sabatti
(2000) and Section 8.3 of Liu (2001) for a general deﬁnition of the GGS.
In our case, we apply the GGS to all parameters ζ ζ ζ = (β β β,δ δ δ,w w w∗,σu,σv) so as to implement
the one-step Metropolis-Hastings (MH) algorithm described below, and take a scale transfor-
mation group, that is, Γ = {g > 0 : g(ζ ζ ζ) = gζ ζ ζ}. Then, the full conditional probability density
function of ˜ g ≡ g−1 is derived as Equation (A.37) in Appendix A.2. This full conditional prob-
ability density function is a nonstandard density function, so that the MH algorithm is adopted
to draw a sample of ˜ g. Starting from the initial value ˜ g = 1, we draw a candidate ˜ g′, which
follows the truncated normal distribution with mean µ˜ g, variance σ2








where µ˜ g = a2/a1 and σ2
˜ g = a−1
1 . See Equations (A.38), (A.39), and (A.41) in Appendix
A.2 for deﬁnitions of a1, a2, and R˜ g. The candidate is accepted with probability α(˜ g, ˜ g′) =
min[1,(˜ g′/˜ g)a0−1], where a0 = n+nu,0+nv,0.
The MH algorithm typically must be repeated in order to obtain a sample from the con-
ditional posterior density function of ˜ g. As we have proved in Appendix A.3, however, it is
suﬃcient to draw a sample only once using the initial value ˜ g = 1. Therefore, the GGS is
14implemented by replacing Step 7 of Algorithm 1.1 described in the previous subsection as
follows:
Algorithm 1.2: Generalized Gibbs step for the model in Equations (12)-(16)
Step 7. Generate ˜ g given β β β,s s s∗,w w w∗,σu,σv.
(a) Generate ˜ g′ ∼ TNR˜ g(µ˜ g,σ2
˜ g) and u ∼ U(0,1), where U(0,1) denotes a uniform
distribution on interval (0,1).
(b) Accept a candidate ˜ g′ if u ≤ α(1, ˜ g′). If rejected, let ˜ g = 1.
Step8. Transformparameters(β β β,δ δ δ,w w w∗,σu,σv)bymultiplyingparametersbyg= ˜ g−1.The
state variable s s s∗ is also updated by this new w w w∗.
Step 9. Go to Step 2.
4 Illustration Using Simulated Data
This section illustrates our Bayesian estimation of the statistical model based on Equations
(12) to (16), using simulated data. We consider two-block increasing block-rate pricing with
1,000 observations. The marginal price for the ﬁrst block is generated using |N(1,0.52)|,
which is the absolute value of a random number following a normal distribution with mean
1 and variance 0.52. The absolute value is taken to guarantee a positive marginal price. The
second block’s marginal price is similarly generated by adding |N(1,0.52)| to the ﬁrst block’s
price. There is one threshold in this price system, which is set equal to 0.5. As for other
variables, income is generated by |N(2,0.52)|, and ﬁxed cost is equal to 0. We consider only
one explanatory variable other than the constant term for heterogeneity following N(0,1).
Thus, δ δ δ = (δ0,δ1)′.
The true parameter values are (β1,β2,δ0,δ1,σu,σv) = (−0.6,0.3,0.1,0.1,0.3,0.1). The re-
gression parameter for price is set to be more elastic than for income based on evidence pro-
15Table 1: Estimation summary with simulated data by GGS
Parameter True Mean SD 95% interval INEF CD ∗∗
GGS / GS ∗
β1 −.6 −.62 .067 [−.76 −.49] 17.2 / 41.7 .116
β2 .3 .35 .10 [ .14 .54] 96.4 / 385.4 .108
δ0 (constant) .1 .090 .11 [−.11 .30] 134.9 / 498.8 .331
δ1 .1 .084 .010 [ .064 .10] 1.7 / 2.7 .205
σu (measurement error) .3 .29 .019 [ .24 .32] 35.5 / 69.2 .468
σv (heterogeneity) .1 .12 .040 [ .054 .20] 49.4 / 90.9 .413
∗ “INEF GGS / GS” denotes the estimated ineﬃciency factors using the Gibbs sampler with
Generalized Gibbs step and the standard Gibbs sampler
∗∗ “CD” denotes the convergence diagnostics.
vided in previous studies on the water demand function; see Table 2 of Hewitt and Hanemann
(1995). The prior distributions are:






















The mean and variance for the precision parameters σ−2
u and σ−2
v are 1 and 102, respectively.
In hierarchical modeling, it is often pointed out that ﬂat or improper prior distributions for
variance parameters may lead to (almost) improper posterior distributions (see, for example,
Section 5.3 of Gelman, Carlin, Stern, and Rubin (1995)), which makes Bayesian inference
unreliable. Thus, we use relatively tight proper prior distributions for σ2
u and σ2
v to avoid
(almost) improper posterior distributions.
We draw MCMC samples via the Gibbs sampler under Algorithm 1.1 and ﬁnd its sample
autocorrelations are very high. Thus, we apply the generalized Gibbs step under Algorithm
1.2, to accelerate convergence of the samples to their posterior distribution. After deleting
3×104 samples, wedraw105 samplesbyapplyingthe accelerationstep. Theobtained samples
are reduced to 104 by selecting every 10-th value. The GGS results are reported in Table 1.
16Because the other results obtained by the Gibbs sampler are very similar to those obtained by
the GGS, we omit them.
Table 1 reports true values, posterior means, posterior standard deviations, 95% credible
intervals, estimatedineﬃciencyfactors, andtheconvergencediagnostics(i.e., thetwo-sided p-
values of the test for convergence). The ineﬃciency factor is deﬁned as 1+2
∑∞
j=1ρ(j), where
ρ(j) is the sample autocorrelation at lag j. It is estimated by using the spectral density; see
Section 3.2 of Chib (2001) for details. It is interpreted as the ratio of the variance of the sample
mean from the Markov chain to the variance of uncorrelated draws. If the ineﬃciency factor
is close to one, the sampling method is almost as eﬃcient as an independent draw. The greater
the ineﬃciency factor becomes, the more samples we need to take to reach convergence. The
convergence diagnostic is the test statistic with a null hypothesis of convergence, as proposed
in Section 3.2 of Geweke (1992). We use the ﬁrst 10% and the last 50% of samples to calculate
this test statistic, as suggested by Geweke (1992).
In Table 1, we found smaller ineﬃciency factors under GGS than GS. We compare these
two samplers in terms of their sample autocorrelation functions. Figure 3 shows the sample
autocorrelation function of β2 for GS and GGS results; autocorrelation decays more quickly
in GGS than in GS. Thus, we conclude that the GGS is eﬀective for β2 in improving sample
convergence.
There are two ﬁndings regarding this simulation. The ﬁrst is the role of the kink point. The
state change helps us to separately estimate measurement error σu and heterogeneity error σv.
When the kink point is chosen, however, other information, such as regression coeﬃcients β β β
and coeﬃcients for heterogeneity δ δ δ is lost, which causes the sampling of our model to become
ineﬃcient.
Second, initial values are important for eﬃcient sampling, which is also a diﬃcult task
in the maximum likelihood method; see Section 4 of Moﬃtt (1986). Because the full condi-
tional distributions, especially for β β β, are restricted to the tight parameter space, samples cannot
17Figure 3: Sample autocorrelation functions for β2.
move freely in their state space. Thus, when initial values are far from true values, it takes
a considerable amount of time for the distribution of the MCMC samples to converge to the
posterior distribution. Because we do not know much about the true parameter values in the






an online questionnaire. The population consists of households between the age of 20 and 79
years in the Tokyo and Chiba prefectures. In June 2006, there were over 8 million such house-
holds. Among these, INTAGE Inc. collected data from 47,239 households, from which we
have randomly chosen 1,678 households. Overall, 1,250 households out of 1,678 participated
in our research.
18Table 2: Variables used in the water demand function
Variable Coeﬃcient Description
year June 2006
num. of obs. 365
price β1 water+sewer (log ¥103/m3)
virtual income β2 two-month income augmented by price (log ¥103)
variables for w∗
i δ0 the constant
δ1 the number of members in a household (person)
δ2 the number of rooms in a house/apartment (room)
δ3 the total ﬂoor space of a house/apartment (50m2)
Table 3: Summary statistics of variables used in the water demand function
Variable Unit Mean SD Min. Max.
the amount of water logm3 3.53 .51 .098 4.87
the two-month income ¥103 1145.00 566.11 166.67 4666.70
the number of members in a household person 3.05 1.22 1 7
the number of rooms in a house/apartment room 4.29 1.10 1 8
the total ﬂoor space of a house/apartment 50m2 1.66 .70 .24 4.60
All households face increasing block-rate pricing, where the number of blocks varies from
ﬁve to eleven (see Figure 4(a)). The dependent variable is the amount of water calculated
from each payment using corresponding price tables. This amount is the water amount that
has been used in the last two months because water is charged every two month in Japan.
The explanatory variables to be used for empirical analysis are summarized in Table 2, and
their summary statistics are found in Table 3 and Figure 4. The number of observations was
reduced to 365 because of the following reasons.
1. Missing data concerning household attributes.
2. Missing data concerning water usage.
3. Diﬃculty in identifying the corresponding rate table.
4. Consumption within the zero marginal price block was observed.






(a) Number of blocks (num-
ber).







(b) Price where the con-
sumption is actually made
(¥103/m3).






(c) Fixed cost (¥103).
Figure 4: Histograms of the number of blocks, price, and ﬁxed cost.
Observations linked to any of the above issues were omitted.
Regarding the income variable, asking households for their exact income level is a sensi-
tive task. In our research, the household annual income is recorded in one of eight intervals
in million yen, including 0-2, 2-4, 4-6, 6-8, 8-10, 10-12, 12-15, and over 15 million yen.
Then, we use the median of the interval divided by 6 as a proxy for two-month income for
most households. Households with annual income over 15 million yen were asked to approx-
imate their annual income, and we divided it by 6 to estimate two-month income for those
households.
5.2 Empirical Result
Initially, the following prior distributions are assumed for the parameters of the demand func-
tion:






















Because the Gibbs sampler (Algorithm 1.1) in Subsection 3.4 is very slow to converge
20Table 4: Water demand function
Parameter Mean SD 95% interval INEF CD ∗∗
GGS / GS ∗
β1 (price) −1.09 .22 [−1.52 − .67] 242.55 / 370.44 .201
β2 (income) .067 .044 [− .028 .14] 272.18 / 583.76 .025
δ0 (constant) .23 .51 [− .89 1.12] 312.61 / 500.76 .055
δ1 (num. of members) .23 .039 [ .16 .31] 54.90 / 63.16 .983
δ2 (num. of rooms) .14 .049 [ .038 .23] 7.65 / 9.31 .198
δ3 (ﬂoor space) .041 .077 [− .11 .20] 7.07 / 7.47 .987
σu (measurement error) .42 .018 [ .38 .45] 8.91 / 19.41 .531
σv (heterogeneity) .20 .038 [ .14 .28] 17.39 / 10.60 .021
∗ “INEF GGS / GS” denotes the estimated ineﬃciency factors using the Gibbs sampler with
Generalized Gibbs step and the standard Gibbs sampler
∗∗ “CD” denotes the convergence diagnostics.
to the posterior distribution, we accelerate the convergence of the MCMC samples using the
GGS described in Algorithm 1.2 of Subsection 3.5. The initial 16×105 samples are discarded,
and the subsequent 4×106 samples are recorded. The recorded samples are reduced to 104
samples by picking up every 400-th value. These estimation results are shown in Table 4.
To ﬁrst check the plausibility of our proposed model, we carried out the numerical poste-
rior predictive checks (PPCs) based on these results; see Chapter 6 of Gelman, Carlin, Stern,
and Rubin (2003). Seven test quantities (including the ﬁrst and third quartile, mean, median,
standard deviation, minimum, and maximum) were chosen to conduct PPCs, and the results
are found in Figure 5. The density plots represent those of test quantities based on the repli-
cated data from the predictive distribution, and the vertical lines denote the values of test
quantities based on the observed data. We also calculated the posterior predictive p-values,
which are shown in parentheses. All density plots and p-values, except those for the mini-
mum, indicate that the discrete/continuous choice model would be plausible to represent our
Japanese residential water demand data. The small p-value for the minimum indicates that
we may need to improve our model for low levels of consumption; the ﬁve lowest levels of
211st q. ( ) p = .082 3rd q. ( ) p = .57 Mean ( ) p = .067 Median ( ) p = .25
Max. ( ) p = .84 Min. ( ) p = 1.00 SD ( ) p = .53
Figure 5: Posterior predictive checks.
consumption are 0.098, 1.79, 1.86, 1.92, and 1.95 logm3. As stated in Remark 2 of Subsection
3.1, for simplicity, we excluded households that consume within the zero marginal price block
so that all consumptions are above this block. The PPC result for the minimum is improved
when we include in the model these households that consume little water, which could be a
future exercise in follow-up studies.
Next, we analyze the GGS results. The posterior mean of the price elasticity, β1, is esti-
mated to be negative at −1.09. Because the 95% credible interval does not include zero, the
probability that β1 < 0 is greater than 0.95. This is consistent with economic theory. However,
the posterior mean of the income elasticity, β2, may equal to zero, because its 95% credible
interval includes zero.
Among the independent variables that are expected to explain individual heterogeneity, the
number of members in a household and the number of rooms in a house or apartment exhibit
a positive relationship with residential water demand because Pr(δj > 0 | y y y) > .95 (j = 1,2).
Furthermore, the former has a larger marginal eﬀect on demand than does the latter. That is, a
one-person increase in a household has greater eﬀect on water demand than does a one-room
extension to a house/apartment does. In contrast, the total ﬂoor space in a house/apartment
(δ3) has no eﬀect on water demand in terms of its 95% credible interval.
We compare these parameter estimates with those of previous studies on water demand.
22Hewitt and Hanemann (1995) used microdata from Denton, Texas and employed the dis-
crete/continuous choice model as the underlying statistical model. Hewitt and Hanemann
(1995) then estimated the water demand function under block-rate pricing using the maximum
likelihood method. Because of the complex form of the likelihood function, that analysis sim-
ply focused on households under two-block increasing block-rate pricing. They reported that
the price and income parameters are −1.8989 and 0.1782, respectively. While these parame-
ters are larger in terms of absolute value than ours, Hewitt and Hanemann (1995)’s estimates
show a similar pattern to ours (i.e., the larger price and smaller income elasticities in their
absolute values).
Olmstead et al. (2007) also applied the discrete/continuous choice model to estimate the
water demand function. They used microdata from the United States and Canada that in-
corporates diﬀerent price schedules, such as two-block and four-block increasing block-rate
pricings and the uniform price system. They showed that the price and income parameters for
households under block-rate pricing are estimated at −0.6411 and 0.1959, respectively.
Dalhuisen, Florax, de Groot, and Nijkamp (2003) analyzed 64 studies on water demand
and presented the meta-analysis on price and income elasticities. They showed that the price
and income elasticities are dispersed with means −0.41 and 0.43, respectively, and standard
deviations 0.86 and 0.79, respectively. Their estimates are somewhat similar to ours when we
take their large standard deviations into consideration.
5.3 Predictive Analysis
At the end of this section, we conduct a posterior predictive analysis on water demand when
the block-rate price schedule is changed to uniform pricing. We consider two types of uniform
pricing; namely, the same uniform price for all households and diﬀerent uniform prices for
each households. For the former, let the unit price be ¥100/m3, ¥250/m3, or ¥500/m3 and set
23the ﬁxed cost to ¥3,500 for every price scenario. These unit prices are inexpensive, almost
as high as, or expensive ones for the majority of households as compared with the present
increasing block-rate pricing, and the ﬁxed cost is set close to the present ﬁxed cost for most
households (see Figures 4(b) and 4(c)). Other variables remain the same. For the latter, we
use the price of the block where water is actually consumed and use it as the single price for
the suppositional uniform price system. The ﬁxed cost remains the same as with the present
schedule. Furthermore, the virtual income for the block where water is actually consumed
is used for total income. Other variables remain the same. Under this hypothetical change,
the budget line becomes the straight line that matches the current piecewise-linear budget line
at the block where water is actually consumed. To analyze the eﬀect of these price schedule
changes, we generate samples of predictive demand using the Gibbs with GGS samples, and





3 different uniform prices
Figure 6: Eﬀects of uniform pricings.
In this ﬁgure, solid lines and boxplots represent plots of actual log demands and box-
plots of predictive distribution for each households, respectively. Water consumption of each
24household is arranged in ascending order, and the number of households is reduced to 60 by
selecting every 6-th household. Each box represents the range between the ﬁrst and third
quartiles. The upper and lower whiskers denote the 95-th and 5-th percentiles, respectively.
The ﬁrst three panels in Figure 6 reveal that most households consume more water as
price decreases, which is consistent with the negatively-estimated price elasticity. The bottom
right panel in Figure 6, however, shows another aspect of our data. From a microeconomic
view-point, a change of this kind has no eﬀect on consumption when an underlying pref-
erence satisﬁes regular assumptions. However, this result is diﬀerent from what we would
expect based on the microeconomic theory, especially for households that consume less than
approximately 3 log m3. When we assume that our statistical modeling is correct, the ac-
tual consumption block for these households is suboptimal partly due to heterogeneity and/or
partly due to measurement error. Thus, this result implies that we may need to take special
care with these households in terms of heterogeneity and/or measurement error.
6 Concluding Remarks
This article proposes a Bayesian estimation method for demand functions under block-rate
pricing and reports empirical analysis using Japanese residential water demand data. Further-
more, the separability condition is explicitly considered to obtain appropriate estimates. Our
method is useful for analyzing demand for water services, as well as for other goods or ser-
vices involving block-rate pricing, including taxes. Furthermore, it would be possible to apply
our method to examine a consumer’s choices over multiple product categories and brands
(Song and Chintagunta, 2007) and a consumer’s selection of wireless calling plans (Iyengar,
2004).
Future research can be conducted on several related issues. First, the supply structure
must be considered when applying our method to other goods under block-rate pricing. Water
25companies are regional monopolists and are obliged to supply as much water as consumers
require. Thus, we excluded ﬁrm competition. Other suppliers, such as telecommunication
services and deregulated electricity services, face no such obligation and compete ﬁercely
with each other. To analyze demand of these services, it is necessary to explicitly consider
the supply structure in our model. Disequilibrium models represent a framework that address
such market structures. See Kunitomo and Sato (1996) and Maddala (1983) for a discussion
of disequilibrium models.
Second, as pointed out in the previous section, there are households that consume less than
the zero marginal price block. The discrete/continuous choice model proposed by this article
excludes such behavior. Developing a structural approach to these consumers is a necessary
aspect of future studies.
Third, substitution among electricity, gas, and other fuels must be considered. It is pos-
sible for the block-rate pricing model proposed here to be extended to a multivariate setting
in a natural way. Furthermore, Japanese gas companies provide natural gas under a decreas-
ing block-rate pricing system. Thus, a subsequent study should examine the energy demand
function under a mixture of increasing and decreasing block-rate pricing.
Finally, an improved convergence acceleration method must be developed. Although the
generalized Gibbs step improved sampling eﬃciency, the regression coeﬃcients β β β still show
high sample autocorrelation. Further improvement of convergence acceleration should be a




This section provides the full conditional distributions for the statistical model in Equations
(12) to (16) following the standard Gibbs sampler’s steps (see Algorithm 1.1 in Subsection
3.4). Let A denote a set of observations that do not select the threshold or kink point as
their demand. That is, A = {i|s∗
i is odd and equal to 2ki −1}. Furthermore, without loss of
generality, we assume that pi1,qi1,¯ yi1 are strictly positive; i.e., pi1,qi1,¯ yi1 > 0. This can be
accomplished by adjusting the unit of measurement for price and income. When Pi1 = 0
(pi1 = −∞), we assume s∗
i ≥ 2 and let pi2 > 0.
Step2. Generate β1 given β2,s s s∗,w w w∗,σ2






































and µβ1,0 is the prior mean of β1. The BLi and BUi are the respective lower and upper bounds
of the interval Bi such that:
Bi =

      






















These Bis are constructed from intervals Ris∗
i and deﬁned in Equations (9) and (10) of Sub-
section 3.1. To sample from the truncated normal distributions, we use the inverse cumulative
27distribution function sampling method; see Section 1.3 of Gamerman (1997).
Step 3. Generate β2 given β1,s s s∗,w w w∗,σ2
u. As in Step 2, the full conditional distribution for β2
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Step 4. Generate (σ2
v,δ δ δ) given w w w∗. Because a blocking technique is applied in this step,
δ δ δ is integrated over the full conditional distribution of (δ δ δ, σ2
v) to obtain the full conditional
distribution of σ2
v. Thus, generate the sample of σ2





2 ), and the sample of δ δ δ from the multivariate normal distribution Nd(µ µ µδ δ δ,1,σ2
vΣ Σ Σδ δ δ,1),
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S v,1 = Sv,0+µ µ µ′
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in drawing samples of (s∗
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for s = 1,...,2Ki −1, where Φ(·) is the cumulative density function of the standard normal
distribution; RUis and RLis denote the respective upper and lower limit of the interval for
heterogeneity; Ris is given by Equations (9) and (10); and (mis,θis,τ2
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v
)
, if s = 2k.
(A.35)
Given s∗
i = s, we generate w∗
i from TNRis(θis,τ2
s).
Step 6. Generate σ2
u given β β β,s s s∗,w w w∗. It is straightforward to show that the full conditional
posterior distribution of σ2
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A.2 Full Conditional Density of ˜ g
We assume that ¯ yi1 is strictly positive. The full conditional probability density function of ˜ g
(= g−1) is derived as follows. First, we substitute parameters multiplied by g (= ˜ g−1) into the
posterior density (25). Because the number of parameters to be accelerated is 4+d+n, the
Jacobian of this transformation is g−(4+d+n). Transforming g to ˜ g, the conditional probability
29density function of ˜ g is given by:
π
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˜ g ∈ R˜ g
)
L(d˜ g), (A.37)
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i are the respective lower and upper bounds of the interval B∗
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A.3 Proof for the One-step MH Algorithm
We prove that it suﬃces to implement a one-step MH algorithm using the initial value ˜ g = 1
in our GGS. By Theorem 2 of Liu and Sabatti (2000), it is suﬃcient to prove that for all
˜ g, ˜ g′, ˜ g0 ∈ ˜ Γ = {˜ g > 0 : ˜ g(x) = ˜ g−1x},
Tζ ζ ζ
(
˜ g, ˜ g′)
L(d˜ g′) = T˜ g−1
0 ζ ζ ζ
(
˜ g˜ g0, ˜ g′˜ g0
)
L(d˜ g′), (A.43)
where Tζ ζ ζ(˜ g, ˜ g′)L(dg′) is the transition kernel of our Markov chain.
30Let qζ ζ ζ(˜ g′) denote our proposal density function. Then, the transition kernel becomes
Tζ ζ ζ(˜ g, ˜ g′) = qζ ζ ζ(˜ g′)α(˜ g, ˜ g′)˜ g′, where the last ˜ g′ is the adjustment term for the left-Haar measure.
It is obvious that the acceptance probability α(˜ g, ˜ g′) is invariant to the scale transformation of
˜ g0. Moreover, we ﬁnd that:























˜ g′˜ g0 ∈ ˜ g0R˜ g
)
˜ g′˜ g0 = qζ ζ ζ(˜ g′)˜ g′, (A.45)
where ϕ(·) is the probability density function of the standard normal distribution. Thus, the
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